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I. Introduction
In many rural areas, a significant proportion of working poor households are self-employed in
farming or other small enterprises. In rural Alaska and on some Native American reservations,
subsistence hunting and fishing is crucial to many households' well-being. Even in urban areas,
many low-income people seek to supplement their incomes by renting out rooms, doing odd
repair work, or selling products of one kind or another. As the economy weakens, opportunities
for low-income people to find traditional wage employment have become extremely scarce.
This may lead even more legal services clients to turn to self-employment ventures to improve
their situations.
Determining income is far more complicated for self-employed workers than for those in
traditional wage employment. Not only is the money that they receive harder to account for, but
an entirely separate analysis--the worker's cost of doing business--must be undertaken. Not
surprisingly, the complexity of these cases--and many eligibility workers' lack of training and
experience in handling them--causes disputes and errors that require the intervention of legal
services advocates.
Quite apart from errors caused by these complexities, however, the regulations of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) deny self-employed households recognition of a large
portion of their cost of doing business: capital costs. The Congressional Budget Office
informally estimates that this regulation reduces food stamp benefits by approximately $20
million a year nationally. Although legal services offices may see clients adversely affected by
this regulation from time to time, the general complexity of the calculations necessary to
determine the countable income of self-employed workers may obscure the remarkably clearcut inconsistency between this regulation and the Food Stamp Act. This article analyzes this
regulation and suggests possible remedies for legal services advocates.

II.

Food Stamp Program and the Self-Employed Workers

A household may be eligible for food stamps if its monthly income is below the national gross
and net income standards. /1/ The size of the household's monthly allotment is based on
household size and net income. /2/ The Food Stamp Act broadly defines "income" to include
"all income from whatever source," subject to several specific exclusions. /3/ The "cost of
producing self-employed income" is one of these exclusions. /4/
Many costs of producing self-employment income are easy to account for and have been
allowed as exclusions with relatively little trouble. These include wages to other workers,
supplies, business taxes, /5/ and license fees. Capital expenses, however, have raised more
difficult problems. The cost of an asset needed to produce self-employment income, such as a
tractor or a fishing boat, may be accounted for in one of two ways: (1) as a direct expense
when the asset is paid for, or (2) through depreciation, as the asset is consumed over time. If
capital costs are treated as direct expenses, they may appear as a lump-sum payment to the
supplier, as installment payments to the supplier, or as payments on a loan obtained to purchase
the asset.
Although one could reasonably argue in support of either method of accounting for selfemployed households' capital costs for the food stamp program, the current regulations permit
neither. 7 C.F.R. Sec. 273.11(a)(4)(ii) states as follows:
"In determining net self-employment income, the following items shall not be allowable
as costs of doing business: (A) Payments on the principal of the purchase price of
income-producing real estate and capital assets, equipment, machinery, and other
durable goods; . . . and (D) Depreciation."
Under this regulation, farmers, for example, can only exclude the part of their payments on
tractors that represents interest. Money that self-employed workers paid out on the principal of
capital assets is treated as income available to the household to spend on food. In selfemployment enterprises, such as farming, fishing, and rental businesses, where property and
equipment account for a large part of workers' expenses, this rule results in a dramatic
overstatement of the income actually available to households. At a minimum, the rule
drastically reduces households' allotments and for many households with very little money
available for food, it denies them food stamps altogether.

III.
Theories for Invalidating the Rule Against Excluding
Capital Costs
A challenge to this regulation should prevail on the basis of the plain meaning of the statute
itself. The Supreme Court has stated that the starting point in any inquiry into the statute's
meaning is "the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to
the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." /6/ In this case, 7
U.S.C. Sec. 2014(d)(9) directs the USDA to exclude from consideration as household income
"the cost of producing self-employed income" without limiting this exclusion to noncapital

costs. /7/ "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." /8/ It is
difficult to find any ambiguity in the language of the statute.
If a court does find it necessary to look beyond the plain language of the statute, the legislative
history of the Food Stamp Act of 1977, which contained the exclusion for the costs of
producing self-employment income, supports an exclusion for capital costs. The House
Agriculture Committee objected to USDA regulations (similar to those now in force) and
expressed the intention that the legislation that it was writing would lead to the allowance of
these expenses:
"[T]he Department has stated that costs of producing income from self-employment are
all costs except: (1) Payments on the principal of the purchase cost of income
producing real estate. Any payments of principal, interest and taxes on the home shall
be subject to paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(h) of this section; (2) Payments on the principal of
the purchase cost of capital assets, equipment, machinery, and other goods; (3)
Depreciation; and (4) A net loss sustained in any previous period.
While there is no reason to permit for food stamp purposes the accelerated forms of
depreciation afforded under the Internal Revenue Code, and some factor for wear and tear of
machinery and buildings, obsolescence and accrued replacement costs should be inherent in
doing business. The full amount of self-employment income would be recognized as income,
but then there would be an exclusion for the cost of producing that income.
Thus, the Department would be expected to revise its regulations in this regard to allow some
form of depreciation in arriving at "net" business income." /9/
In implementing the 1977 Act, the USDA duly revised its regulations the next year so that
"depreciation [is] allowed as a cost of producing self-employment income for equipment,
machinery or other capital investments necessary to the self-employment enterprise." /10/ The
Department stated that "a provision allowing depreciation as a cost of doing business for selfemployed households [was included] in compliance with the legislative history [accompanying
the Food Stamp Act of 1977] H.R. Rep. No. 95-464." /11/
In 1981, however, the USDA reversed its position /12/ and denied households an exclusion for
depreciation in calculating their costs of doing business. /13/ The USDA based this change on
the recommendations of the conference report on the Food Stamp Act Amendments of 1980.
/14/ Although the 1980 conference report did urge "that the Secretary no longer permit
depreciation to be subtracted in determining net self-employment income," /15/ this
recommendation has very little legal significance and should not bar a challenge to this
regulation.
No amendment to section 2014(d)(9) was included in the 1980 legislation; indeed, none was
included in either house's version of the legislation. Absent any relevant provision in any
legislation enacted into law, or even in the House or the Senate bills under consideration in the
conference committee, this statement's only possible legal significance would be as "post-

enactment legislative history" seeking to reveal the intent of an earlier Congress that passed
section 2014(d)(9) as part of the Food Stamp Act of 1977.
The general rule is that "the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for
inferring the intent of an earlier one." /16/ In Waterman S.S. Corporation v. United States, for
example, the Court ruled that without new legislation the views of a "subsequent Congress
would not supplant the contemporaneous intent of the Congress which enacted the Act." /17/ In
Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, the Court distinguished between
subsequent legislation enacted into law, which is entitled to "great weight" in interpreting
earlier legislation, and mere "post-enactment legislative history" recorded by a member or
committee within Congress:
"With respect to subsequent legislation, however, Congress has proceeded formally
through the legislative process. A mere statement in the conference report as to what
the Committee believes an earlier statute meant is obviously less weighty.
The less formal types of subsequent legislative history provide an extremely hazardous
basis for inferring the meaning of a congressional enactment. . . . Such history does not
bear strong indicia of reliability, however, because as time passes memories fade and a
person's perception of his earlier intention may change. Thus, even when it would
otherwise be useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely override a reasonable
interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative history
prior to its enactment." /18/
Accordingly, the 1980 conference report's statement deserves little, if any, deference. The
regulation, therefore, should be judged by how closely it conforms with the language of the
statute and contemporaneous legislative history.
Indeed, the court can readily order a remedy that reconciles the statute's command to exclude
all costs of producing self-employment income and the 1980 conference committee's
recommendation that depreciation no longer be allowed. The 1980 conference committee's
desire can be accommodated consistently with the statute by permitting the exclusion from
income of payments on the principal of the purchase cost of capital assets, equipment,
machinery, and other goods as a cost of producing income. /19/
The USDA's 1981 rule also has been criticized in a subsequent Congress. In its report to
accompany the Hunger Prevention Act of 1988, the Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry denounced the rule and urged litigation to return to the pre-1981 rule.
The Committee stated that "the Committee by no means claims that this bill eliminates all of
the barriers to participation in the food stamp program by farmers and other self-employed
individuals." /20/ The Committee reiterated that the intent of the Food Stamp Act is to allow all
work-related expenses of self-employed workers to be excluded in determining net income for
eligibility purposes, stating that under its bill
"farm households with regular incomes but irregular expenses [would] have their
incomes and expenses averaged over the year just as would be done if their gross
income itself was variable. In so doing, the Committee does not intend to dictate what

accounting methods the Department will use to count farm (or other) households'
expenses as long as households receive credit for all expenses legitimately related to
their work." /21/
The Committee did not act to amend the statute, presumably because the statute is already
clear. /22/
Therefore, even if the court were inclined to give credence to postenactment legislative history,
it now exists for both sides of the debate. No persuasive reason exists for honoring the 1980
legislative history criticizing depreciation while ignoring the 1988 legislative history objecting
to the denial of an exclusion for capital costs, particularly when the two can be reconciled by
allowing capital costs to be excluded as paid rather than through a depreciation allowance. /23/
More importantly, the only legislative history contemporaneous with the enactment of the
statutory provision at issue clearly requires that households' capital costs be taken into account.

IV.

Conclusion

The USDA's regulation denying self-employed people an exclusion for capital expenses is
wholly inconsistent with the Food Stamp Act. Although the USDA may have discretion under
the statute to specify the method by which self-employed workers' costs are excluded in
determining their net incomes, it does not have authority to inflate their incomes artificially by
ignoring their capital costs. The USDA's 1981 rulemaking should be entitled to little deference,
/24/ particularly because it represents a reversal of an earlier rule adopted contemporaneously
with the statute. /25/
One court of appeals has questioned the propriety of this regulation sua sponte, /26/ but no
court has yet ruled on it directly. The paucity of affirmative litigation is not entirely surprising
in light of the factual complexity of these cases. Few self-employed households affected by this
regulation have the legal sophistication to understand the calculations that the food stamp office
makes to determine their eligibility; many may have had doubts about their eligibility before
they applied, and most probably assume that the food stamp office knows what it is doing when
it denies their applications or provides only minimal benefits.
As long as this regulation remains in force, it will continue to undermine the intent of Congress
to encourage self-sufficiency for food stamp recipients. /27/ In litigating on behalf of eligible
clients adversely affected by this regulation, advocates should be able to present self-employed
workers in an extremely sympathetic light, whether they are marginal farmers, hunters or
fishers, or low-income people in a metropolitan area who earn money as vendors or landlords,
or through other ventures. A successful challenge to the regulation would help these workers
feed their families and allow them to continue in ventures that may lead to long-term selfsufficiency.
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